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Debating PBS: Public Broadcasting and the
Power to Exclude Political Candidates from
Televised Debates
Erick Howardt
Televised political debates are an integral part of the contemporary American political system, providing candidates both
an opportunity to challenge the views of their opponents directly
and exposure to the voting public. Debates also give the public a
"raw" view of candidates, independent of their carefully prepared
televised advertisements.
Although courts agree that private television stations may
exclude qualified candidates for public office from televised
political debates,' it is not clear whether public television stations may do so.2 In recent cases, plaintiffs have argued that
public television stations are government actors. Therefore, when
they exclude candidates from televised debates, they engage in a
form of government censorship that violates the First Amendment.3 The two circuits that have considered the issue are split.
The Eleventh Circuit held that state-owned and operated public
television broadcasters4 are government actors, but that they
have discretion to promulgate reasonable regulations regarding
the content of the programs they air. Under this rationale, the
broadcasters can exclude candidates from debates without violating the First Amendment.5 The Eighth Circuit, however, has
ruled that as state actors, public television broadcasters may not

t B.A. 1993, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate 1996, University of Chicago.
' See Johnson v FCC, 829 F2d 157, 165 (DC Cir 1987). See also In re Sagan, 1 FCC
Rec 10 (1986).
2 See Forbes v Arkansas Educational Television Communication Network Foundation, 22 F3d 1423 (8th Cir 1994), cert denied, 115 S Ct 500 (1994); Chandler v Georgia
Public Telecommunications Conm'n, 917 F2d 486 (11th Cir 1990), cert denied, 502 US
816 (1991).
See Chandler, 917 F2d at 488; Johnson, 829 F2d at 159.
Neither Forbes nor Chandler involved privately-owned, nonprofit public television
stations and no case has arisen involving such a station. Because this Comment argues
that the status of the broadcaster as nonprofit, state owned, or private is irrelevant to the
resolution of the issue, the term "public broadcaster" or "public television station" shall be
read to include state-owned public television stations.
' See Chandler,917 F2d at 489; Johnson, 829 F2d at 164.
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exclude a candidate from 6 a debate unless there is a compelling
state interest in doing so.
The split between these circuits centers on a struggle between expansive broadcaster discretion in programming and
limited discretion in programming based on the status of the
broadcaster as private or public. Whether public television stations may constitutionally exclude candidates from televised
debates raises basic questions concerning broadcasters' proper
place in the constitutional scheme and their proper role as sources of political information.
As this Comment will show, the distinction between public
and private television stations is irrelevant to determining the
constitutionality of restricting access to station-sponsored programs. Rather, the question should be whether there is something "special" about public broadcasters such that they should
not be allowed to restrict candidates from debates.
This Comment will argue that public broadcasters' ability to
exclude candidates from debates actually preserves First Amendment values by ensuring that broadcasters are not dissuaded
from airing controversial topics. Further, this Comment will
explain that Congress's regulatory scheme provides a public
interest safeguard to ensure that a candidate's views will be
aired even if the candidate is barred from a particular broadcast.
This safeguard applies to all television stations and guards
against impermissible censorship, whether a private or public
station is involved. Thus, there is nothing "special" about public
television stations that should bar them from restricting
candidates' access to political debates. While candidates cannot
be denied access to a private or public station merely because of
their viewpoint, candidates do not have a First Amendment right
to speak on a particular program. Recognizing a candidate's right
to appear on particular programs would undermine First Amendment values and chill stations from engaging in expressive
activity.
Part I examines the contrasting rationales of the Eleventh
and Eighth Circuit's decisions with respect 'to this issue. Part II
then analyzes public television stations as public fora for expressive activity and the duties of those stations under Congress's

See Forbes, 22 F3d at 1430. In reaching this conclusion, the court overruled part of
an earlier Eighth Circuit case, which held that state agencies are restricted only by
Communications Act requirements when picking candidates to appear on televised debates. DeYoung v Patten, 898 F2d 628 (8th Cir 1990).

PUBLIC BROADCASTING
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regulatory scheme. Finally, part III explores the strengths and
weaknesses of the Eleventh and Eighth Circuit approaches in
light of the mandates of the Communications Act of 1934
("Act"). This Comment concludes that the Eleventh Circuit's
approach, which allows public broadcasters to ban political
candidates from debates, best resolves this issue.
I.

CONTRASTING APPROACHES OF THE ELEVENTH AND EIGHTH

CIRCUITS

A. The Eleventh Circuit's Approach: Allowing Public
Broadcasters Broad Programming Discretion
In Chandler v Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission,' the Eleventh Circuit held that a public television station
could refuse to allow political candidates to participate in televised debates sponsored by the station.9 In Chandler, the station
denied a Libertarian Party lieutenant governor candidate's request to be included in a station-sponsored debate between Democratic and Republican gubernatorial candidates.1" The plaintiff
argued that excluding him from that debate violated his First
Amendment rights.'
Holding for the defendant, however, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that the station was not a "pure marketplace of ideas"
because not everyone who wished to express his or her view could
gain access to airtime. 2 In addition, as a state-owned public
television licensee, the station was charged with presenting programming in the public interest.1 3 The court noted that employees of the station made the editorial decisions regarding their
public interest requirements. 4 In so doing, they made contentbased decisions, because deciding to air one program rather than
Communications Act of 1934, 47 USC §§ 151 et seq (1988).
917 F2d 486 (1lth Cir 1990).
SId at 488.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 The court wrote: "[T]he degree of control that a public broadcast licensee can exercise over its broadcast programming consistent with the First Amendment depends on
the mission of the communicative activity being controlled." Chandler, 917 F2d at 488,
citing Schneider v Indian River Community College Foundation,Inc., 875 F2d 1537, 1541
(11th Cir 1989)(discussing scope of public television broadcasters' power to censor news
coverage). The court further stated that where the activity did not function as a pure
marketplace of ideas, the state could regulate content "in order to prevent hampering the
primary function of the activity." Chandler,917 F2d at 488.
8

13

Id.

" Id at 488-89.
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another necessarily affected the content of the station's programming.15 Similarly, the court argued, the station made a permissible content-based decision when it chose to include only Democratic and Republican candidates in its debate because it had
concluded that a debate exclusively between those candidates
would be of the greatest interest to the citizens of Georgia.1" The
court concluded that the station could make judgments regarding
which candidates to include in televised debates, so long as those
judgments were not efforts to suppress an excluded candidate's
views." The court explained that the station's content-based
decisions were not viewpoint restrictive because the decisions
were not "an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's views. " "
Underlying the court's reasoning lay a fear that requiring
public television stations to include candidates in debates would
cause the stations to avoid controversial public issues. 9 The
court explained that if it required the station to include candidates that had obtained a ballot position, it could not see a principled way to exclude all other serious candidates. 0 Such a requirement might force public stations to forego airing programs
on controversial issues, because airing such programs would then
require the "inclusion of a cacophony of differing views" on those
issues." The values central to the First Amendment would be
frustrated rather than facilitated
by an inclusionary mandate on
public television stations.2 2

'5
'6

Id at 489.

Chandler,917 F2d at 489.
The station did, in fact, offer the excluded candidates, including the plaintiff, thirty
minutes of air time to present their views after the debate. Id at 488 n 1.
18 Id at 489, citing Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense and Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 US
788, 800 (1985)(finding that federal charity organization was a nonpublic forum, and
therefore legal defense and political advocacy organizations could be excluded from
communicative access to the charity organization).
19 Chandler,917 F2d at 489-90.
20 "The mixture of ideas, protected by the First Amendment, is just as protected when
offered by a write-in candidate as by one on the ballot by petition, by primary election, or
by party convention." Id at 489.
21 Id at 490.
Id. Initially it might appear that a "cacophony of differing views" on controversial
issues would facilitate expressive values because the public would be exposed to a large
amount of information on a given issue. However, with so many voices speaking on
particular programs, the messages might not be dispersed as effectively.
17
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B. The Eighth Circuit Approach:
Programming Discretion

439

Limiting Broadcaster

In Forbes v Arkansas EducationalTelevision Communication
23 the Eighth Circuit refused to grant a
Network Foundation,
public television station the broad discretion in programming
authorized by the Eleventh Circuit. Faced with facts similar to
those of Chandler,' the Eighth Circuit found that the excluded
candidate had a qualified right of access created by Arkansas
Educational Television Communications Network Foundation's
("AETN") sponsorship of the debate.2"
In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit overruled a portion of DeYoung v Patten," which had held that there is no right
to appear in a television debate, except as provided for in Section
315 of the Communications Act of 1934.27 The court found

DeYoung patently flawed because it allowed the station, an admitted state actor, the power to "exclude all Republicans, or all
28
Methodists, or all candidates with a certain point of view ....

The court held that the plaintiff, as a qualified political candidate, had a basic right of access to the broadcast media.29
Adopting a traditional public forum analysis, the court argued that the station could not exclude the plaintiff without articulating a compelling state interest for doing so." The Forbes
court noted that the Supreme Court recognized three categories
of government property: the traditional public forum, the limited
public forum, and the nonpublic forum. 3' A traditional public
forum has "by long tradition or by government fiat.., been devoted to assembly and debate."3 This type of forum did not apply to public television stations because there was no unlimited
2' 22 F3d 1423 (8th Cir 1994), cert denied, 115 S Ct 500 (1994).
2
The plaintiff, Ralph Forbes, was an independent candidate for United States
Representative for the Third Congressional District of Arkansas. Like the plaintiff in
Chandler, he had received enough signatures to qualify for the ballot, but the public
station decided to air a debate including only the two major-party candidates. Forbes, 22
F3d at 1426.
25 Id at 1428.
26 898 F2d 628 (8th Cir 1990).
27 Id at 633-35.

2
2

Forbes, 22 F3d at 1428.
Id.

'0 Id at 1429.
31Id.
' See Perry Education Ass'n v Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 US 37, 45
(1983)(holding interschool mail system to be a nonpublic forum even though civic and
church organizations were allowed access to the system; therefore the school board could
prevent a teachers' union from using the system).
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right of access to the airwaves." A limited public forum is not
generally open for public expression, but is open, by government
designation, for limited speech purposes.3 4 The Forbes court
stated that the government might have created a limited public
forum when it decided to sponsor a political debate among candidates.3" The court concluded that if the government had created
a limited public forum, the plaintiff could be excluded only if
AETN had a sufficient government interest in doing so.3 A
nonpublic forum is usually considered incompatible with expressive activity. 7 Even in such fora, however, the court argued that
minimum First Amendment requirements applied, and the government could not deny the plaintiff access merely because of
objections to his viewpoint. 8 The court concluded that AETN
could ban the plaintiff from the debate only if it provided a rational, viewpoint-neutral justification for doing so. 9 Additionally,
the court noted the plaintiffs allegation that the defendant station had denied the candidate any access to the station, so that
he could not even respond to the views expressed in the debate.'

Forbes, 22 F3d at 1429.
See Heffron v InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 US 640,
655 (1981)(holding that a State can limit the manner in which a religious organization
propagated its views in a limited public forum where all organizations distributing materials in the forum were subject to the same restrictions).
Forbes, 22 F3d at 1429.
Id. AETN did not file an answer to the plaintiffs complaint, and thus had not offered any reason for excluding him from the debate. Id at 1430.
'7 See Cornelius, 473 US at 806.
The Forbes court quoted Cornelius:
Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. Although a speaker
may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not
encompassed within the purpose of the forum, or if he is not a member of the
class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created, the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to
suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.
Forbes, 22 F3d at 1429, quoting Cornelius, 473 US at 806. The Forbes court argued that
the plaintiff was a member of the class of speakers for which the forum was created because he was a candidate for the congressional seat and because he wished to address
who should be elected to Congress, a topic clearly encompassed by the debate. See Forbes,
22 F3d at 1429.
39

Id at 1430.

0 Id. Allegedly, an official at AETN told plaintiff that the station would run "St.
Elsewhere" rather than a debate that included him. In addition, the station allegedly refused plaintiff airtime to respond to the views expressed in the debate. This contrasts
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The Level of Programming Discretion Afforded Public
Television Stations

Forbes and Chandler express two conceptions of the scope of
public broadcaster discretion and the nature of the television
station as an expressive forum. Chandler represents a view that
public television operators are merely broadcasters and not state
actors. Under Chandler, public television broadcasters can make
even content-based decisions, so long as they are not viewpoint
restrictive, because broadcasters generally must make such decisions."' This theory conceives of the state as taking on the full
rights and responsibilities of broadcasters when it decides to involve itself in broadcasting.
By contrast, Forbes understands the public broadcaster as
part of the state. Because the broadcaster remains an instrumentality of the state, it must continue to adhere fully to First
Amendment limitations on state action. Therefore, under Forbes,
a public broadcaster cannot make the same content-based decisions that a private broadcaster may make. The public broadcaster is not the same as a private broadcaster because it has a state
identity that is fundamental to its existence. It is precisely because the broadcaster is part of the state that its discretionary
power is limited by the First Amendment.
Equally important are the two circuit courts' contrasting
conceptions of the broadcast station as a forum for expression.
Chandler views the television station, rather than the individual
programs aired on the station, as the forum for speech. Individual programs, even if conceived by the broadcaster, are not fora
but rather stages through which speakers can gain access to the
broadcast media.
In contrast, Forbes sees the broadcast station as merely a
medium for which speakers create programs, which are the real
fora. In its discussion of AETN's power regarding the three types
of public fora, the court repeatedly stated that by sponsoring a
debate, AETN had created either a limited public or nonpublic
forum. 2 The debate, then, focused on whether a right of access
to programs existed, as opposed to a right of access merely to the
broadcast station. This conception of individual programs as fora,
and the station as merely a medium, comports with the Eighth
sharply with the actions of the station in Chandler, where the station offered excluded
candidates thirty minutes to respond to the debate. Chandler, 917 F2d at 488 n 1.
Id at 489.
42 Forbes, 22 F3d at 1429.
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Circuit's view of the public broadcaster as essentially a state
actor. If the broadcaster is another arm of the state, then the
station is essentially a mechanism through which the state can
accomplish its goals.' These goals are furthered by creating fora
(i.e., individual programs) on the stage. When free expression
questions arise, Forbes looks to the programs to see if the state
has impermissibly abridged free speech rights. Thus the Forbes
conception finds the state identity of public broadcasters to be a
"special" quality that limits their otherwise broad discretionary
power.
Although the Forbes court's public forum analysis is the
correct way to consider the problem, the analysis should find that
public broadcasters have the discretion to exclude candidates
from programs in order to protect First Amendment values. As
Chandler recognizes, the "special" quality of public broadcasters
is not that they are arms of the state, but rather that they are
broadcasters. As broadcasters they have public interest duties
under the Communications Act of 1934 that limit their discretion
in making programming choices. In 'addition, because public
stations are at least limited public fora, they are restricted in
their ability to limit the expressive activities of those demanding
access to the station. Recognition of a candidate's constitutional
right to appear on a particular program would limit broadcaster
discretion to the point that broadcasters would avoid airing controversial issues. In this respect, Chandler recognizes that given
the public interest standard and the public station's status as at
least a limited public forum, we can preserve First Amendment
values best by allowing public broadcasters the discretion to exclude candidates from particular debate programs.
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
ACT OF 1934 AND PUBLIC TELEVISION STATIONS AS LIMITED
PUBLIC FoRA

The justification for allowing public broadcasters the discretion to exclude candidates from particular debate programs is the

product of both the broadcaster's public interest duties under the
Communications Act and the station's status as a limited public
forum. Under the public interest standard, broadcasters have a

The state goals in this instance may be merely to disseminate information to the
public. However, under the Forbes view, because the state must continue to limit itself as
the state, it cannot merely take on all the rights and responsibilities of other broadcasters
and ignore limitations on government power.
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duty to air controversial topics and political views with which
they do not necessarily agree." Nevertheless, the courts have
found that broadcasters have broad discretion to determine what
is in the "public interest."4 5
Public stations and their programs also are limited public
fora, from which candidates cannot be banned merely because of
their viewpoint.' Broadcasters can fulfill their public interest
requirements only if they have discretionary authority with respect to the proper forum. To avoid chilling coverage of controversial views or topics, broadcasters should have the authority to
exclude candidates from particular debates, but not from stations
altogether. Such a system would allow broadcasters to make
permissible content-based decisions concerning particular programs while simultaneously prohibiting impermissible viewpointbased restrictions regarding station programming as a whole.
A.

The Public Interest Standard and Broadcaster Authority to
Make Content-Based Decisions

The Communications Act of 1934 ("the Act") contains requirements broadcasters must satisfy to acquire and retain their
broadcast licenses. 47 Under the Act, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") may grant or renew licenses only if
doing so will further the public interest.4" Thus, if broadcasters
wish to retain their licenses, they must continually meet the
requirements of a public interest standard mandated by the
49
Act.
The Act defines the public interest as that which furthers the
"convenience and necessity" of the community." The public interest standard requires all television broadcasters "to cover

Andrew 0. Shapiro, Media Access: Your Rights to Express Your Views on Radio
and Television, ch 1 at 7 (Little, Brown and Co, 1976).
' Massachusetts Universalist Convention v Hildrethand Rogers Co., 183 F2d 497 (1st
Cir 1950)(finding that radio station broadcaster had sufficient discretion to exclude
religious sermon from programming lineup).
' See Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981)(finding that state university violated
First Amendment when it denied a student religious organization the use of university facilities where it allowed all other student organizations use of the same facilities).
" The use of a frequency is a privilege and may not exceed three years, after which
broadcasters must submit their licenses to the Federal Communications Conunission
("FCC") for renewal. Communications Act of 1934, 47 USC §§ 301, 307(a), 307(d), 309(a)
(1994).
4
47 USC § 309(a).
" Shapiro, Media Access at 7 (cited in note 44).
'o Id.
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political events and to provide news and public affairs programs
dealing with the political, social, economic and other issues which
concern their community.""1 That standard includes encouraging
public debate by airing issues that evoke diverse or controversial
viewpoints.52
The courts have held that broadcasters have broad discretion
to determine what is in the public interest.53 For instance, in
Massachusetts Universalist Convention v Hildreth & Rogers Co.,
the First Circuit stated that "the [Communications] Act does not
expressly confer on anyone any right to broadcast any material at
any time ....The licensee is obliged to reserve to himself the
final decision as to what programs will best serve the public interest."" Similarly, the court in Gemini Enterprises, Inc. v
WFMY Television Corp.," stated that because broadcasters are
"gatekeepers who control much of the flow of information in our
society," they are free under the First Amendment to refuse individuals and groups access to programming. "These principles are
grounded in the fundamental protections provided by the First
Amendment .... Within wide bounds, the First Amendment
protects the ability of these gatekeepers to make decisions without government interference." 5
The courts also have recognized that public broadcasters
have wide-ranging authority to make programming decisions. For
instance, in Muir v Alabama Educational Television Commission, 7 the Fifth Circuit explained that "[t]he pattern of usual
activity for public television stations is the statutorily mandated
practice of the broadcast licensee exercising sole programming
58
authority."
Though broadcasters have broad discretion to decide what is
in the public interest, this discretion is not absolute; the licensee

" See Muir v Alabama EducationalTelevision Comm'n, 688 F2d 1033, 1044 (5th Cir
1982Xfinding that public broadcast licensees possess the same rights and responsibilities
to make free programming decisions as their private counterparts, though as state instrumentalities, they lack First Amendment protection); Representative Patsy Mink (WHAR),
59 FCC2d 987 (1976); Federal Communications Commission, FairnessDoctrine and Public
Interest Standards, 39 Fed Reg 26371 (1974).

Shapiro, Media Access at 7 (cited in note 44).
Massachusetts Universalist Convention, 183 F2d 497; Gemini Enterprises, Inc v
WFMY Television Corp., 470 F Supp 559 (M D NC 1979)(discussing rights and responsibil52

ities of broadcast licensees in general).

Massachusetts Universalist Convention, 183 F2d at 500.
Gemini, 470 F Supp at 568.

Id.
5 Muir, 688 F2d at 1033.
" Id at 1042.
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must be willing to broadcast views with which it may disagree or
run the risk of losing the privilege to broadcast. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that the mandates of the
public interest standard might conflict with a broadcaster's expressive inclinations. Therefore, in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v
Federal Communications Commission,59 the Court stated that
broadcaster discretion ends where the public's right to truly informative broadcast material might be infringed."
The public interest standard thus ensures that television
serves as a true medium of information and not merely as a
mouthpiece for the views of the broadcaster or the privileged few
who gain access to the media. However, the broadcaster's ability
to determine and then broadcast what is in the public interest
depends directly on the forum in which the broadcaster's discretion functions. Television stations' expressions can be seen as
occupying two distinct fora: the station as a whole or the programs aired by the station. Only where broadcasters are allowed
to retain control over the content of individual programs, but
have more limited discretion regarding overall programming, can
we protect First Amendment values. Circumscribing broadcaster
discretion with regard to both overall programming and individual programs jeopardizes First Amendment values because broadcasters can not effectively carry out their public interest duties
under such restrictions.61
B. The Public Television Station as a Limited Public Forum
Courts should view public television stations as limited public fora. Though public stations generally are not open for the
public to use for expressive purposes, they do allow certain classes of speakers to use the station.62 Notably, the public interest
standard prevents all television stations from being nonpublic
fora because the standard removes the broadcaster's authority to
control what subject matter can be discussed on the station.'

59 395 US 367 (1969).

'" Id at 390. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id.
Muir, 688 F2d at 1044.
See Widmar, 454 US at 263, where the Supreme Court held that if a state university opened its facilities to student organizations, but not to the general public, then those
facilities became limited public forums.
' Broadcasters cannot, for instance, declare that no political discussions may be
aired on the station. By virtue of the public interest standard, broadcasters must air such
programs. Moreover, due to the breadth of the term "public interest," broadcasters cannot
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Whatever the station regards as in the public interest must be
aired on the station, even if the broadcaster dislikes the subject
matter.6 Public stations extend an open invitation to political
candidates to appear or speak because they usually hold views
important to the public interest.6 5 As managers of limited public
fora, broadcasters constitutionally cannot exclude candidates
from the station because of their viewpoint."6 Therefore, a
broadcaster cannot deny a candidate access to the station merely
because of the views held by the candidate, unless there is a compelling state interest for doing so. 7
C.

Individual Programs as Limited Public or Nonpublic Fora

As the Forbes court recognized, courts might consider individual programs sponsored by the public station, such as debates,
either limited public or nonpublic fora. A court might view a
debate program as a limited public forum because when the station sponsors the debate, it extends an invitation to a class of
speakers to express their views in the public broadcasting forum.
However, a debate might also be a nonpublic forum because the
station's invitation to the class of speakers is not general, but
focused on a subclass of specific candidates. Of course, whether
the court considers the station a limited public or nonpublic forum, the broadcaster cannot deny candidates access to the program because of their views, unless there is a compelling state
interest for doing so."

declare that certain political controversies, such as welfare or abortion rights, cannot be
aired on the station.
Red Lion, 395 US at 390.
5 Viewers are extended an invitation to watch or decline to watch a broadcast
station, not to schedule programs or appear on programs themselves. See Muir, 688 F2d
at 1042.
' See Forbes v Arkansas Educational Television Communication Network Foundation, 22 F3d 1423, 1429 (8th Cir 1994). See also 47 USC § 315(a)(mandating that a

broadcaster cannot allow a candidate to use his or her station to express a view without
affording other qualified candidates the same opportunity).
Even if public television stations were nonpublic fora in which there is no require-

ment to allow access for expressive purposes, the broadcaster still could not ban candidates from the station because of their viewpoint. For instance, if public stations were
nonpublic fora, then broadcasters could ban all political debate from the forum. However,
if the broadcaster decided to allow any political debate on the station, no candidate could
be banned from the station merely for holding a view with which the broadcaster disagrees. See Greer v Spock, 424 US 828 (1976)(finding that political candidate could be

denied access to military base for speech purposes because the base was a nonpublic
forum despite the fact that nonpolitical figures had been given access to the base to
disseminate their views).
" Note that this contention is based on pure public forum analysis. Normatively, to
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Broadcasters' authority and duties under the public interest
standard come into conflict with public forum doctrine where the
doctrine forbids broadcasters from excluding candidates because
of their views. Especially with respect to particular programs, a
candidate's right to speak is not necessarily coterminous with the
public interest in all cases.69 Thus broadcasters are given the
difficult task of balancing their public interest standard duties
with the access requirements of public forum doctrine. What
emerges is a distinction between permissible content-based restrictions and impermissible viewpoint restrictions. The struggle
between the Chandler and Forbes conceptions of broadcaster
discretion rests, in part, on whether courts can separate content
and viewpoint restrictions such that public broadcasters have
some authority over who may gain access to station-sponsored
programs.
III. THE CHANDLER COURT'S APPROACH IS SUPERIOR TO THAT OF
THE FORBES COURT

As discussed in part I, the Chandler" and Forbes" courts
view both the discretion of the public broadcaster and the nature
of the broadcast station in fundamentally different ways. The
Chandler court equates public and private broadcasters in terms
of their rights and responsibilities." In addition, it sees the station as the forum for expression.73 In contrast, the Forbes court

protect First Amendment values, it might be better to allow broadcasters the discretion to
exclude candidates only from programs because of their viewpoint. The candidate would,
of course, retain the right of access to the station more generally through a different program.
' For instance, a broadcaster might want to sponsor a debate only between the
leading proponents of opposing views. The broadcaster may have picked these views for
expression on this single program because they are the ones of most concern to the public.
Arguably, allowing every proponent of fringe viewpoints might not be in the public interest in that setting, because allowing these speakers access to the program would confuse
issues rather than focus and clarify them. In other programs sponsored by the station,
these views may be essential to the public interest, but that does not mean that they
must be essential to the present debate program.
70 917 F2d 486 (11th Cir 1990).
71 22 F3d 1423 (8th Cir 1994), cert denied 115 S Ct 500 (1994).
7 Chandler,917 F2d at 488.
73 Id at 489.
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sees the broadcaster as an arm of the state and therefore subject
to First Amendment burdens not shared by private broadcasters.7 4 Under the Forbes approach, individual programs are the
fora subject to First Amendment analysis.75
The Chandler conception better protects First Amendment
values by striking a balance between broadcaster discretion and
public forum concerns. Chandler recognizes that the "special
quality" of public broadcasters is their duty to make programming decisions in the public interest. In order to fulfill that duty
and to avoid violating the access requirements of the public forum doctrine, courts should strictly limit broadcaster discretion
concerning the right of access to the station, while allowing expansive discretion concerning access to particular programs.
A.

The Broadcast Station as the Relevant Forum

As stated in part II, the most important factor in determining how much discretion public broadcasters should have is the
conception of the relevant forum. Where a court considers the
broadcast station itself the relevant forum for limiting discretion,
broadcasters can make content-based decisions but must avoid
impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination. Broadcasters can
accomplish this because where the station is the relevant forum,
its programs contribute to forming the forum. Evaluating whether there has been impermissible discrimination in the forum
involves considering overall programming. Courts should require
broadcasters to adhere strictly to the mandates of the public
forum doctrine and allow political candidates access to the station to express their views.
For example, in Chandler the public station included only
major party candidates in its debate, even though the Libertarian
candidate wanted access. Clearly the station made a contentbased decision by allowing some, but not all, candidates to join
the debate. If the inquiry were to end here, then the station
would fail a public forum analysis because the excluded candi-

7'

75

Forbes, 22 F3d at 1428.
Id at 1429.
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date would have been banned due to his views.76 The station
would also fail a public interest standard test because it did not
present a contrasting viewpoint arguably concerning the public
interest.
However, the station in Chandler did offer the excluded
candidate time to respond to the views expressed in the debate.
By doing so, the station avoided viewpoint discrimination and
met its public forum requirements because the candidate expressed his views and the station did not disfavor his viewpoint.
In addition, the station passed a public interest standard because
the candidate's views were a matter of public interest and the
candidate fairly expressed these views. Thus, where the broadcast station is the relevant forum for limiting broadcaster discretion, the station can make content-based decisions without viewpoint discrimination because the inquiry examines all programming before judging whether there has been a First Amendment
violation.
In contrast, broadcasters cannot escape viewpoint discrimination if, as Forbes envisions, the individual programs aired on the
station are the relevant fora for limiting discretion. Viewpoint
discrimination occurs under this conception because the court
considers the programs separately from one another. Therefore,
any decision to restrict content in a particular program necessarily discriminates against viewpoints excluded from the program.
Under this view, programs cannot balance one another to avoid
viewpoint discrimination on the station.
If the debate program is the only relevant forum for limiting
discretion then the station described in the example above would
fail both public forum analysis and the public interest standard
by excluding the Libertarian candidate. Unlike the example described above, an offer by the station to grant the candidate time
to respond to the debate in a separate program would not correct
the imbalance in the debate." The station could not rectify the
restriction on free expression that occurred when the station

" This Comment assumes that the station is at least a limited public forum from
which the candidate could not be excluded unless there was a sufficient state interest in
doing so. In limited public fora, the state may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.
" Indeed, the response program would be its own forum, to which other candidates
could possibly demand access.
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excluded the candidate from the debate by granting him airtime
after the debate. Under this view, the only way to avoid viewpoint discrimination is to allow all who desire it access to the debate.
The Chandler approach gives effect to the balancing of discretion, free expression in public forum doctrine, and the public
interest standard while the Forbes approach ignores this balancing and creates an inclusive rule for political candidates. Because
the Forbes view destroys the balance between discretion and free
speech values, it removes broadcaster discretion in programming
because once a station extends an invitation to speakers, the
broadcaster has no authority to focus the possible debate or exclude outlandish fringe views that are not truly matters of the
public interest. The Forbes conception purports to destroy the
balance to avoid opportunistic government censorship of political
views. Though the Forbes view may do that, it also endangers the
free expression it seeks to protect by chilling the expressive activities of broadcasters.
The weakness of the Forbes conception becomes apparent
when one considers the relationship between the public interest
standard and public forum doctrine. As explained above, public
broadcasters must balance the requirements of these two concepts to retain their licenses and avoid constitutional violations.
If, as Forbes would require, broadcasters must include all candidates demanding access to a station-sponsored program, broadcasters might choose not to air those programs at all. A broadcaster might choose such an approach for two related reasons.
First, allowing every candidate access to the programs of their
choice would be too difficult to organize. The broadcaster might
fail altogether, or the resulting program might be so confusing as
to be rendered meaningless.7" Second, the broadcaster might
avoid such programs to protect its license. If a broadcaster attempted to sponsor a debate including all candidates and an
excluded candidate brought suit, the station's license might be in
jeopardy because of the constitutional violation. To avoid this
problem, broadcasters might reasonably decide not to air programs whose access requirements could endanger their licens79
es.

7 See Chandler, 917 F2d at 489. In addition, the universe of candidates might be
broader than just candidates on the ballot, and under the Forbes rationale, these candidates should also be allowed access to the program.
" The public interest standard's mandate is general and does not require broadcast-
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Debates, interview shows, and other programs which invite
candidates to express their views are an important and effective
means of disseminating political information as well as focusing
and clarifying matters of public interest. The Forbes conception
would chill broadcasters' inclination to air such programs, and
therefore would obstruct the free expression of ideas. Because
Forbes is not sensitive to the relationship between the public
interest standard and public forum doctrine, and does not appreciate the pressures placed on broadcasters by that relationship, it
harms the First Amendment values it seeks to protect. On the
other hand, the Chandler approach accounts for the relationship
between the public interest standard and public forum doctrine
and appreciates the repercussions of that relationship for broadcasters. Therefore, courts should adopt the Chandler view.
B. Public Broadcasters as State Actors: The Danger of
Opportunistic Censorship has been Negated by Regulation
Even if the Chandler view is the correct approach to the
forum conception issue, Forbes might still be correct that public
television broadcasters, inasmuch as they are part of the state,
should bear greater First Amendment scrutiny. Although fears
about government control over expression and overzealous
abridging of speech are real concerns, the public interest standard largely negates them. Under this standard, the broadcasters
must cover political issues. This necessarily entails allowing
access to candidates with whom the broadcaster may not agree.
The station will present all candidate views for public scrutiny,
but not necessarily on every prograim it runs.
Initially, the Forbes conception appears appealing because it
assures that stations will allow qualified candidates to speak in
the forum of their choosing, thus contributing to the information
available to the public. The Forbes argument against allowing
state-owned stations the authority to exclude candidates is strong
because such an exclusion immediately raises the specter of government censorship. Where a state-run network decides that only
Republicans and Democrats may appear on a debate sponsored
by the station, the state arguably is attempting to shape what
the voting public should find politically important. The fact that

ers to air certain formats. Therefore, a broadcaster could decide not to air any debates on
the station, though it would have to cover political issues in some manner. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 USC §§ 301, 307(a), 307(d), 309(a) (1988).
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state control over the local station is likely quite strong strengthens this suggestion.80 The state creates the station and employs
the broadcasters that staff it.
The Forbes conception loses its theoretical power when one
considers the safeguards of the public interest standard. The
Forbes approach appears to conceive of broadcaster decision making as if it occurred in a vacuum, without any restriction on its
reach. However, the public interest standard marks the outer
boundaries of broadcaster discretion, thereby curbing a broadcaster from ignoring viewpoints with which he or she does not
agree. The standard largely negates the danger of influence over,
or collusion with, the broadcaster. The FCC, not local monitors,
enforces the Communications Act against broadcasters. While
state or local governments might have considerable influence
over public stations, the FCC has ultimate control because it can
"pull the plug" on the broadcaster. Thus, FCC authority negates
whatever suppressive influences state governments might have
over broadcasters.
The Chandler conception recognizes that broadcasters do not
act in a vacuum, but rather that these public interest requirements influence them to a great degree. Discretion therefore is
permissible, so long as the public forum and public interest requirements effectively limit this discretion.
As the Chandler court noted, broadcasters must necessarily
make content-based decisions, while the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-based decisions as derogations of the freedom of
speech and expression." Chandler created a scheme that promotes broad discretionary authority restricted by public interest
concerns in order to assure that candidate views will be communicated to the public. Under that scheme, broadcasters may make
any programming decisions they want as long as they do not
completely exclude candidates from the broadcast station."
When examining the exclusion of candidates from debates, it is
thus proper to look at the provisions the broadcaster has made to

o See Community-Service Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc. v FCC, 593 F2d 1102,

1115-16 (DC Cir 1978Xfinding that statutory enactment requiring that public radio and
television stations make and keep recordings of all political broadcasting unduly burdened
public broadcasting licensees and presented a risk of direct governmental interference
with program content).
8 Chandler, 917 F2d at 489.
"
The court in Chandler stated that the station offered candidates excluded from the
debate the chance to respond to the debate and present their views. Unlike in Forbes,
there was no attempt by the station to completely cut a candidate off from the broadcast
medium. Id at 488 n 1.
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allow the excluded candidates the opportunity to express their
views. Only through such an examination may one discover if the
broadcaster attempted impermissibly to silence the candidate's
83
view and infringe upon his or her First Amendment rights.
Under the Chandler conception, it is unimportant whether
the station is private or public television. The regulatory scheme
negates the special identity of a public station as a part of the
state. Private stations can exclude candidates because the public
interest standard restrains the otherwise unchecked danger that
broadcasters will censor political speech. The standard acts on
discretion in the same way, by disallowing unreasonable exclusion from the broadcast media, whether the station is private or
public. Therefore, the power to exclude candidates from debates
should cut across the two forms of broadcast licensing because in
neither is there a real possibility that a candidate will be totally
banned from the medium.
Of course, the manner in which a station expresses their
views may concern candidates as much as whether the station
expresses it at all. Candidates might argue that the debate context is such a unique medium of expression that it becomes fundamental to that type of expression. After all, debates are the
only opportunity for opponents to meet "in the rough" without the
benefit of carefully prepared speeches or presentations. A candidate may gain notoriety, positive exposure, and voting support
from such meetings. Therefore, the argument goes, it would not
be enough simply to allow the candidate response time, or ensure
that his or her views receive fair coverage in the station's overall
programming, because these methods of expression do not result
in the same benefits for the candidate as a debate.
This argument, however, places too much weight on the longterm importance of debates on the psyche of the public. During a
campaign, the voting public receives many political messages
from the candidates, and the totality of those expressions likely
forms an impression of the candidate, not the debates alone. Debates are not, then, a form of expression in themselves, vital to
campaign success, but merely one medium among many through
which candidates may express their views.

' Thus, while the rationale of Forbes is flawed, its holding might nonetheless be correct because it appears that the station made no attempt to offer the plaintiff access by
means of another program to the station to reply to the views expressed in the debate.
See Forbes, 22 F3d at 1429-30 n 4.
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The Chandler conception complements the courts' understanding of broadcaster discretionary power by recognizing that
candidates have a general right of access and that broadcasters
have a duty to air candidates' views if they are in the public
interest. Additionally, the Chandler conception solves the state
action problem because it recognizes that the key question is not
whether a station is private or public, but rather, whether the
forum of television broadcasting has an unchecked authority to
censor political speech. The Chandler conception thus makes the
state-actor question virtually irrelevant to the inquiry, and concludes that public as well as private broadcasters have the authority to exclude candidates from televised debates.
CONCLUSION
Government censorship of political speech in the United
States has always been abhorred in principle and generally
avoided in practice. Since its inception in 1934, the Communications Act has attempted a precarious balancing act: on the one
hand serving the public interest by providing broadcast stations
to disseminate information, while on the other hand creating a
manageable system of accountability for the broadcast licensees
airing the information. Broadcasters, too, have been forced to
balance the demands of being public trustees with the freedom of
journalistic expression. Debates between qualified candidates for
political office represent a difficult area of action for broadcasters
because whether including or excluding certain candidates from a
debate will be in the public interest is uncertain. The sponsoring
station's status as a public station exacerbates this problem because the station becomes a limited public forum in which the
station cannot exclude candidates merely because of their views.
Moreover, these entities are more likely to be seen as arms of the
government, thus raising the specter of government censorship.
The key question that courts must resolve is whether public
broadcasting stations have the discretion to exclude candidates
from debates. Properly understanding the relevant forum for
limiting discretion answers this question. The public interest
standard only has logical effect if the broadcast station is the
relevant forum for limiting broadcaster discretion. Thus, as the
Chandler conception of broadcaster discretion shows, when examining whether a station has violated a candidate's First Amend-
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ment rights, one must examine whether the station has provided
a reasonable means for the candidate to express his or her views,
not whether the station allowed the candidate to appear on a
particular program.

